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Abstract—This paper considers secure simultaneous wireless
information and power transfer (SWIPT) in cell-free massive
multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) systems. The system
consists of a large number of randomly (Poisson-distributed)
located access points (APs) serving multiple information users
(IUs) and an information-untrusted dual-antenna active energy
harvester (EH). The active EH uses one antenna to legitimately
harvest energy and the other antenna to eavesdrop information.
The APs are networked by a centralized infinite backhaul which
allows the APs to synchronize and cooperate via a central
processing unit (CPU). Closed-form expressions for the average
harvested energy (AHE) and a tight lower bound on the ergodic
secrecy rate (ESR) are derived. The obtained lower bound on
the ESR takes into account the IUs’ knowledge attained by
downlink effective precoded-channel training. Since the transmit
power constraint is per AP, the ESR is nonlinear in terms of
the transmit power elements of the APs and that imposes new
challenges in formulating a convex power control problem for
the downlink transmission. To deal with these nonlinearities, a
new method of balancing the transmit power among the APs via
relaxed semidefinite programming (SDP) which is proved to be
rank-one globally optimal is derived. A fair comparison between
the proposed cell-free and the colocated massive MIMO systems
shows that the cell-free MIMO outperforms the colocated MIMO
over the interval in which the AHE constraint is low and vice
versa. Also, the cell-free MIMO is found to be more immune to
the increase in the active eavesdropping power than the colocated
MIMO.
Index Terms—Cell-free massive MIMO, SWIPT, active eaves-
dropping, secrecy, energy harvesting, artificial noise
I. INTRODUCTION
In contrast to multi-cell massive multiple-input multiple-
output (MIMO) systems in which the users in each cell
(of a confined area) are served by an array of colocated
antennas, cell-free massive MIMO is an architecture in which
the users over a large area are served by a large number
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of distributed antennas (access points (APs)) [1]. Given the
provision of backhaul phase-coherent cooperation between the
APs [2]–[4], the distributed deployment of the APs offers
many advantages such as: eliminating the correlation between
the transmitting antennas, the ability to overcome deep shadow
fading, and more importantly, the large freedom in balancing
the simultaneous transmissions of information, jamming and
energy signals.
In massive MIMO systems, the asymptotic orthogonality
between independent users’ channels makes downlink trans-
mission very robust against passive eavesdropping attacks [5].
Therefore, the active eavesdropping attack in massive MIMO
systems (which introduces correlation between the estimated
channels of both the attacker and the attacked user) is relevant.
Active information-eavesdropping relies on attacking the up-
link channel estimation phase by sending an identical training
sequence as the legitimate information user (IU), such that the
estimated IU’s channel is correlated with the channel of the
attacking eavesdropper (EV). Therefore, the active EV benefits
from the downlink transmission which is beamformed based
on the estimated IU’s channel [5], [6].
The broadcast nature of the wireless channel imposes chal-
lenges in securing wireless communication systems, particu-
larly, in the presence of adversarial EVs [7]. One example of
such systems is simultaneous wireless information and power
transfer (SWIPT) systems that comprise information-untrusted
EHs. The secrecy issue in SWIPT massive MIMO systems,
particularly under active attack, has previously lacked in-depth
study in the literature. The main body of research concerning
the secrecy problems in SWIPT systems has considered the
colocated massive MIMO architecture [8]–[13]. The large
dimensionality of transmit antennas in massive MIMO systems
allows the use of random matrix theory to simplify the system
design and performance analysis. Moreover, the asymptotic
orthogonality between independent users’ channels encourages
the use of artificial noise (AN) jamming against any potential
information eavesdropping. In [8], an asymptotic expression
for the ergodic secrecy rate (ESR) of one IU and one passive
information-untrusted energy harvester (EH) (both have mul-
tiple antennas) is derived in terms of the covariance matrix of
the downlink signal vector. This asymptotic ESR is maximized
by optimizing the covariance matrix subject to some average
harvested energy (AHE) constraints. The AN jamming can be
deployed in the downlink transmission phase to provide direct
power transfer and to degrade the information signal quality
2at the EHs [9]. In [12], the use of AN is extended for both the
downlink training and payload data transmission phases to fur-
ther degrade the eavesdropping capabilities of the information
EV. The authors in [13] considered joint enhancement of the
secrecy and power transfer in the presence of an active dual-
antenna information-untrusted EH. Asymptotic expressions for
a lower bound on the ESR and the AHE are derived. Then,
these results are used to optimize the power allocation for
the downlink SWIPT transmission. Throughout the literature,
much of the research regarding optimizing the performance of
cell-free MIMO systems deals with the spectral efficiency [2,
and the references therein], the energy efficiency [14]–[17],
and the secrecy rate of wire-taped systems [18].
This paper investigates the design and the performance
evaluation of SWIPT in cell-free massive MIMO, particularly,
the secrecy of the information transmission under an active
attack from a dual-antenna information-untrusted EH. From
the service provider (cooperative APs) point of view, the dual-
antenna active EH’s request for service equivalently appears as
a separate legitimate EH using a training power φPE (where
0 < φ < 1 and PE is the total available training power)
via the energy harvesting antenna, and illegitimate active EV
attacking a certain IU with training power (1−φ)PE . However,
the cooperative APs can rely on their large dimensionality
to monitor the levels of training powers, therefore, they can
blame the legitimate EH for the active attack. Upon the
detection of the active attack, the cooperative APs have no
option but to deal with this attack, and only two possible
actions might be taken: 1) Dropping the IU under attack
from service, i.e., stop sending information to the IU being
attacked. With an exception for IUs receiving information
with a high degree of importance, such an action seems
impractical. Therefore, there is no secrecy design for the
downlink transmission; 2) Dealing with the case by optimising
the secrecy of the downlink transmission. Taking this action
is useful and practical, particularly with the advantage of the
large dimensionality of the APs.
Contributions: We are motivated by the lack of literature on
the security of cell-free MIMO systems to provide a new glob-
ally optimal solution to the problem of joint power and data
transfer in a cell-free massive MIMO system. The proposed
system established by a large number of randomly (Poisson-
distributed) located APs which cooperate via a central process-
ing unit (CPU). The communication links between the APs and
the IUs are vulnerable to be wire-tapped by an information-
untrusted dual-antenna active EH. Since the transmit power
constraint is per AP, the secrecy rate is nonlinear in terms
of the transmit power elements of the APs and that imposes
new challenges in formulating a convex power control prob-
lem for the downlink transmission. The main contributions
of our work are: 1) To jointly improve the ESR and the
AHE (of the legitimate EH), we propose optimized downlink
transmissions of three different signals: information, AN and
energy signals beamformed towards the IUs, legitimate and
illegitimate antennas of the EH, respectively; 2) We derive
closed-form expressions for the AHE and a tight lower bound
on the ESR. The derived expressions are deterministic at
the CPU and take into account the IUs’ knowledge attained
by downlink effective precoded-channel training; 3) Knowing
that the ESR is nonlinear in terms of the transmit power
elements of the APs, a new globally optimal iterative method
for cooperatively balancing the transmit powers at the APs
via relaxed semidefinite programming (SDP) is derived; 4) We
provide a proof for the rank-one global optimality of our SDP
solution (Theorem 3) and the convergence of our iterative SDP
problem (Subsection IV-C2); 5) Finally, a fair performance
comparison between the proposed cell-free and colocated
massive MIMO systems is performed. The comparison shows
informative results of the secrecy performance with respect to
the active eavesdropping training power and the range of the
AHE constraint values.
Related Work: To the best of the authors’ knowledge, the
secrecy performance in cell-free massive MIMO systems has
only been studied in [18] where the focus was on maximizing
the secrecy rate of a given IU when being attacked by an
active EV under constraints on the individual rates of all
IUs. We can compare the work in this paper to the work
in [18] from two perspectives: 1) From system and signal
design perspectives, our work considers the worst-case SWIPT
problem by optimizing three different downlink signals: infor-
mation, AN and energy signals beamformed towards the IUs,
legitimate and illegitimate antennas of the dual-antenna EH,
respectively; while work in [18] considers the secrecy problem
of a certain IU by optimizing the downlink information signals
(no jamming or power transfer are considered); 2) From a
problem-solving perspective, the employed lower bound on
the secrecy rate in [18] imposes constraints on the domain
of the linear programming (LP) optimization variables (the
allocated power of the downlink information vectors) [18,
(23)], i.e., the values of allocated power vectors are feasible
on a sub-region of RN+ , N is the total number of APs.
Since the update in the proposed iterative algorithm does not
include the power vector of the considered IU, the obtained
solution is locally optimal, or at least, the globally optimal
solution is not guaranteed. In contrast, in our work, both the
objective function and constraints of the SDP formulation are
differentiable and there are no constraints on the domain of
the optimization variables which implies the satisfaction of
Slater’s condition. Therefore, by proving the optimal rank
requirements (please see Theorem 3 and its proof) and the
convergence of the employed iterative problem (please see
Subsection IV-C2), we claim the global optimality of our
solution. In our early work in [13], an active dual-antenna
information-untrusted EH (equivalent to the proposed EH
in this paper) has been considered for a colocated SWIPT
massive MIMO system. However, considering such a secrecy
problem for cell-free massive MIMO will result in a non-linear
objective function in terms of the allocated power elements at
the APs. Inevitably, this problem can not be solved by the LP
method used for a colocated massive MIMO in [13], and this
leads to a completely different SDP optimization challenge.
Notation: For referencing convenience, the notations used
in this paper are listed in Table I at the top of the next page.
3TABLE I
LIST OF NOTATIONS
Notation Description
a, A
vectors and matrices are denoted by boldface lowercase
and boldface uppercase letters, respectively
IN denotes the N ×N identity matrix
diag(s)
a matrix whose diagonal entries are the entries of vector
s and zeros elsewhere
diag(S)
a column vector whose entries are the diagonal entries of
matrix S
S  0 indicates that S is a positive semidefinite matrix
(·)T and
(·)H
the transpose and the conjugate transpose, respectively
tr(·) and
log2(·)
the trace of a matrix and logarithm to base 2, respectively
|·| and ‖·‖
the absolute value of scalars and the Euclidean norm,
respectively
R, Rn+,
Sn+ and
Cm×n
sets of real numbers, nonnegative real numbers, symmetric
positive semidefinite n × n real matrices and complex
m× n matrices, respectively
CN (0,Σ)
circularly symmetric complex Gaussian distribution of a
random vector with zero mean and covariance matrix Σ
cov(x, y)
and var(x)
the covariance between the random variables (RVs) x and
y, and the variance of x, respectively
{an} and
{am,n}m
a set of all vectors indexed by n and a set of all scalars
indexed by m, respectively
[a]n and
[A]n,m
the nth entry of a and the (n,m)th entry of A, respec-
tively
B =
null (A)
means AB = 0 and BBH = I
[x]+ is equivalent to max (x, 0)
II. SYSTEM MODEL
As illustrated in Fig. 1, we consider the downlink of a
cell-free massive MIMO system consisting of a large number
of APs which are randomly located on a two dimensional
Euclidean area Aa based on an homogeneous Poisson point
process (PPP) Φa with an intensity λa; M single antenna IUs
interested in information decoding, {IUi}, i = 1, 2, ...,M ;
and an active information-untrusted EH, equipped with two
antennas, where one antenna is used to legitimately harvest
energy, while the other antenna is used to illegitimately and
actively eavesdrop and decode an information signal intended
for a certain IU, IUk, k ∈ {1, 2, ...,M}. Unless otherwise
stated, the IUs and the EH are randomly located on a two
dimensional Euclidean area Au < Aa
1. The origins of both
Au and Aa coincide. The APs are networked by a central-
ized infinite backhaul which allows them to synchronize and
cooperate via a CPU.
Let {AP1, . . . ,APN} be the set of the adopted real-
ization of APs. hi = [hi,1, . . . , hi,N ]
T = Γ
1
2
i h¯i denotes the
uplink channel vector between IUi and the set of APs,
where h¯i ∼ CN (0, IN ) is the small-scale fading vector
and Γi = diag([γi,1, . . . , γi,N ]), γi,j is the large-scale fad-
ing coefficient of the channel between IUi and APj .
1Since each user (IU or EH) is dominantly served by a subset of the
APs. Therefore, the assumption Au < Aa introduces an overlap between
the dominant AP groups serving different users. From the secure SWIPT
design point of view, this case is more severe than the case when the users
are widely apart, i.e., Au = Aa.
Fig. 1. An illustration of the proposed SWIPT cell-free
massive MIMO system, only a small number of APs is
illustrated for clarity.
g = [g1, . . . , gN ]
T = Γ
1
2 g¯ and gE = [gE1 , . . . , gEN ]
T = Γ
1
2 g¯E
denote the uplink channel vectors between the legitimate and
the illegitimate (eavesdropping) antennas of the EH and the
set of APs, respectively, where g¯ = [g¯1, . . . , g¯N ]
T , g¯E =
[g¯E1 , . . . , g¯EN ]
T ∼ CN (0, IN ) are independent, uncorrelated
small-scale fading vectors. Γ = diag([γ1, . . . , γN ]) where γj is
the large-scale fading coefficient of the channel between the
EH and APj . The large-scale fading coefficients {γi,j , γj}
change very slowly compared to the small-scale fading co-
efficients, therefore, we assume that {γi,j , γj} are perfectly
known at the APs [19].
A. Uplink Channel Estimation
The user small-fading channels manifest block fading, i.e.,
they remain constant over one time block, but change indepen-
dently from one block to another. Each time block is divided
into three time slots of lengths: τ transmission samples for
uplink training, τd transmission samples for downlink training
and τs samples for downlink data transmission. Without loss
of generality, we assume a unit time slot for the downlink
data transmission τsTs = 1s, where Ts is the duration of the
transmitted data symbol [8], [20]. During the uplink training
phase, a training sequence is sent from each IU with an
average power PI . Pessimistically, we assume that the EH
has the potential to acquire the training sequence of a certain
IU (made possible by overhearing the leaking electromagnetic
signalling between the APs and the IUs [21]). Therefore, the
EH sends a copy of the training sequence of the attacked IU,
IUk, k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M}, via its eavesdropping antenna using
part of its total average power φPE , 0 < φ < 1, such that
the cooperative APs estimate the uplink composite channel
coefficients of both IUk and the eavesdropping antenna of
the EH. Consequently, the estimated channel of IUk will be
corrupted and correlated with the illegitimate channel of the
EH [5], [22]. The remaining training power (1−φ)PE is used
for transmitting the legitimate uplink training sequence via the
4energy harvesting antenna. The uplink training sequences of
the IUs and legitimate EH are assumed to be orthogonal. The
signal at the APs received across τ training transmissions is
Y =
M∑
i=1
√
PI hi ψ
T
i +
√
φPEgEψ
T
k +
√
(1− φ)PEgψTE +N ,
(1)
where N ∈ CN×τ is the additive noise matrix with entries
following the distribution CN (0, σ2n). k is the index of the
attacked IU, IUk. ψi, ψk, ψE ∈ Cτ×1 are the uplink training
sequences of IUi, the IU under attack, IUk, and the legitimate
antenna of the EH, respectively. ψHi ψj 6=i, ψ
H
i ψE = 0;
and ψHi ψi, ψ
H
EψE = τ . We assume centralized channel
estimation via the CPU. Given that IUk is the attacked IU,
the minimum mean square error (MMSE) estimate of hi,
hˆi = [hˆi,1, . . . , hˆi,N ]
T , and of g, gˆ = [gˆ1, . . . , gˆN ]
T , are
given as
hˆi = Ciyi, Ci =
√
PIΓi
(
τPIΓi + δik τφPEΓ+ σ
2
nIN
)−1
,
(2a)
yi = Y ψ
∗
i = τ
√
PIhi + δik τ
√
φPE gE +Nψ
∗
i , (2b)
gˆ = Cy, C =
√
(1− φ)PEΓ
(
τ(1 − φ)PEΓ+ σ2nIN
)−1
,
(2c)
y = Y ψ∗E = τ
√
(1− φ)PE g +Nψ∗E , (2d)
where δik = 1 if i = k (i.e., IUi is the attacked IU) and δik = 0
if i 6= k. The covariance matrices E[hˆihˆHi ] and E[gˆgˆH ] are
equal to Ri = τ
√
PIΓiCi and R = τ
√
(1− φ)PEΓC,
respectively. To emphasize whether IUi is being attacked or
not, we use Ri to describe the covariance matrix of IUi if
not being attacked and R¯i to describe the covariance matrix
of IUi if being attacked. Both Ri and R¯i are calculated by
the same aforementioned formula, but with k 6= i for Ri
and with k = i for R¯i. The results in (2a) and (2c) follow
from standard channel estimation theory [23], [24]. Active
eavesdropping attack detection and the identification of the
attacked IU, IUk, are possible and have been studied in [25]–
[27]. Alternatively, the cooperative APs can exploit their large
dimensionality to detect the active eavesdropping attack by
monitoring the values of training powers which have been
proven to be accurate as N →∞. The CPU can calculate the
eavesdropping (illegitimate) and the legitimate training powers
of the EH, φPE and (1 − φ)PE , respectively, by using the
following lemma2
Lemma 1: For a large density of APs as λa → ∞, which
leads to a large number of APs as N → ∞, any illegitimate
active training power can be identified and calculated as
yHi yi − τ2PI tr (Γi)−Nτσ2n
τ2tr (Γ)
N→∞→ δik φPE , (3)
where IUi is under attack if δik = 1, i.e., k = i, and IUi is not
being attacked if δik = 0, i.e., k 6= i. All the scalars, vector
2Since the cooperative APs are able to monitor the changes in the training
powers of the IUs and the EH using Lemma 1, we assume that the cooperative
APs blame the information-untrusted EH for the active eavesdropping attack.
and matrices in the left-hand side of (3) are deterministic at
the CPU.
Proof: See Appendix A.
B. Downlink Transmission
The APs cooperate via the CPU to control the power
allocation of the downlink data, AN, and energy signal trans-
missions. From the service provider (cooperative APs) point
of view, the EH’s request for service equivalently appears to
the cooperative APs as a separate legitimate EH which uses
a training power φPE and illegitimate active eavesdropper
attacking a certain IU, IUk, with a training power (1−φ)PE .
However, the CPU relies on the large dimensionality of the
APs to monitor the levels of training powers, and based on
Lemma 1, it can blame the legitimate EH for the active attack.
Upon the detection of the active attack, the CPU has no option
but to deal with this attack, and only two possible actions
might be taken:
• Dropping the IU under attack from service, i.e., stop
sending information to the IU being attacked. With an
exception for IUs receiving information with a high
degree of importance, such an action seems impractical.
Therefore, there is no secrecy design for the downlink
transmission.
• Dealing with the case by optimizing the secrecy of down-
link transmission (by employing controlled transmissions
of information, jamming and energy signals). Taking
this action is useful and practical, particularly with the
advantage of the large number of randomly located APs.
Compared to the case of collocated APs (conventional
MIMO), the average path-loss from an AP to the active
EH and the attacked IU varies from one AP to another.
This property of randomly distributed APs would increase
the efficiency of power control in tackling the active
eavesdropping.
Given that the IUk is the attacked IU, the APs employ the
matched filter (MF) precoder to transmit the downlink signal
vector
xk =
M∑
i=1
wiqi + w¯kz +w, (4)
where the jth entry of xk, [xk]j , is the signal transmitted by
APj , wiqi is the information signal vector directed towards
IUi, w¯kz is the AN signal vector directed towards the eaves-
dropping antenna of the EH, and w is the energy signal vector
directed towards the legitimate antenna of the EH. {qi} and z
are the information signal symbols intended for {IUi} and the
AN symbol, respectively, and they are mutually independent
and follow the distribution CN (0, 1). The MF beamforming
vectors in (4) are defined as3
wi = diag (pi) hˆ
∗
i , pi =
[√
pi,1, . . . ,
√
pi,N
]T
, (5a)
w¯k = diag (p¯) hˆ
∗
k, p¯ =
[√
p¯1, . . . ,
√
p¯N
]T
, (5b)
3Please note, due to active attack, the hˆk used to design w¯k in (5b) is the
estimate of the composite channel of both hk and gE . By optimizing the per
AP AN power factors {p¯1, . . . , p¯N}, the AN power can be maximized at
the EH and minimized at the IUk .
5w = diag (p) gˆ∗, p = [
√
p1, . . . ,
√
pN ]
T
. (5c)
For example, | [wi]j |2 = pi,j |hˆi,j |2, | [w¯k]j |2 = p¯j |hˆk,j |2 and
| [w]j |2 = pj|gˆj |2 are the allocated powers at APj for IUi’s
data, AN and energy signals, respectively. Power allocation is
controlled via the factors {pi,j}, {p¯j} and {pj}. Referring to
(2a) and (5b), it can be noticed that the received AN signal
power at the eavesdropping antenna of the EH, |gTEw¯k|2,
is directly proportional to the eavesdropping training power,
φPE , i.e., the larger the eavesdropping training power, the
larger the jamming received power by the EH. Therefore,
although the AN is aligned to the IUk’s estimated channel
coefficients, the cooperative APs can improve the information
secrecy by exploit the nature of the cell-free system – in which
IUk and the EH experience different path-losses to a single AP
– by optimizing the per AP per user power control.
Given that IUk is the attacked IU. The received signals at
IUi, yk,i; the legitimate antenna of the EH, yk; and at the
eavesdropping antenna of the EH, yEk , are
yk,i = h
T
i xk + ni, (6a)
yk = g
Txk + nˆ, (6b)
yEk = g
T
Exk + n¯. (6c)
where ni, nˆ and n¯ are zero mean σ
2
n variance complex
Gaussian noises at IUi, the legitimate and eavesdropping
antennas of the EH, respectively.
C. Downlink Effective Precoded-Channel Estimation
With a large number of APs, the channel estimation at all
IUs requires training sequences of a length ≥ N which is
practically infeasible. Alternatively, we propose the estimation
of the effective precoded-channels, {ai,i = hTi wi} at the IUs4.
The downlink estimation of the effective precoded-channels at
the IUs requires M orthogonal training sequences that can be
of a finite length, ≥M . Therefore, such a downlink estimation
is practically possible. Notice that IUi needs to estimate its
effective precoded-channel ai,i which includes the values of
power control factors {pi,j}, {p¯j} and {pj}. Therefore the
values of {pi,j}, {p¯j} and {pj} to be used for downlink
data transmission are employed for downlink training. The
cooperative APs transmit the downlink training signal matrix
Xd =
∑M
i=1wi ψ
T
di
, where {ψdi} – ψHdiψdi = τd and
ψHdiψdj 6=i = 0 – are the downlink training sequences of the
IUs5. The received training signal vector at IUi, yIi ∈ C1×τd
is
yIi = h
T
i Xd + ni =
M∑
j=1
ai,jψ
T
dj
+ ni, (7)
where ai,j = h
T
i wj and ni ∼ CN (0, σ2nIτd) is the noise
vector at IUi. First, let us examine the MMSE estimate of ai,i
at IUi which can be calculated as [23], [24]
pTi ΓiRipi
pTi ΓiRipi + τdσ
2
n
yIi , (8)
4The EH has the potential to estimate the precoded channel for the attacked
IU, bk = g
T
Ewk , however, as will be seen in Subsection III-B, the worst case
in which the EH can perfectly estimate bk is assumed.
5 The same training sequences could be used in the uplink and downlink.
where yIi = yIiψ
∗
di
= τdai,i + niψ
∗
di
. However, since the
allocated power control factors in pi are not available at IUi,
the calculation of (8) is not possible, and instead, we assume
that IUi performs a simple least square error (LSE) estimate
of ai,i, aˆi,i which is given as
aˆi,i =
yIi
τd
= ai,i + a˜i,i, (9)
where a˜i,i =
niψ
∗
di
τd
is the estimation error which is statistically
independent from the effective precoded channel ai,i.
III. SECRECY ANALYSIS
A. Lower Bound on the IU Rate
The received signal at IUi given in (6a) can be recast as
follows
yk,i = ai,iqi + Zk,i
= E [ai,i|aˆi,i] qi + (ai,i − E [ai,i|aˆi,i]) qi + Zk,i,
(10)
where
Zk,i =
∑
j 6=i
ai,jqj + h
T
i (w¯kz +w) + ni. (11)
E [ai,i|aˆi,i] qi is the desired information signal received
through a deterministic precoded channel E [ai,i|aˆi,i], while
(ai,i − E [ai,i|aˆi,i]) qi is the desired information signal re-
ceived through a non-deterministic precoded channel ai,i −
E [ai,i|aˆi,i]. E [ai,i|aˆi,i] qi and (ai,i − E [ai,i|aˆi,i]) qi are statis-
tically dependent. Zk,i is the equivalent noise
6 which accounts
for inter user interference, energy signal interference and the
thermal noise. Referring to (9), we can see that ai,i is explicitly
decoupled and therefore ai,i and a˜i,i are uncorrelated and
statistically independent. Since aˆi,i is deterministic at IUi, then
E [ai,i|aˆi,i]
= E [aˆi,i|aˆi,i] + E [a˜i,i|aˆi,i] = aˆi,i + E [a˜i,i] = aˆi,i, (12a)
ai,i − E [ai,i|aˆi,i] = a˜i,i, (12b)
where E [aˆi,i|aˆi,i] = aˆi,i follows as an expectation over a
deterministic value; E [a˜i,i|aˆi,i] = E [a˜i,i] follows from the
statistical independence between a˜i,i and aˆi,i; and E [a˜i,i] = 0
follows since E
[
niψ
∗
di
]
= 0. Using the results in [28,
Theorem 1] and in [29, (22)], the downlink information rate
at the attacked user IUk, Rk (given in (13)) is achievable and
forms a lower bound on the ergodic information rate
Rk = E {log2 (1 + SINRk)} , (13)
where
SINRk =
|aˆk,k|2
E
[
|ak,k − E [ak,k|aˆk,k]|2
]
+ E
[
|Zk,k|2
]
=
|aˆk,k|2
var (a˜k,k) + var (Zk,k)
,
(14)
6Zk,i is considered as an equivalent noise since Zk,i and E [ai,i|aˆi,i] qi
are independent and that follows since {qj}, z, ni and w are statistically
independent.
6Theorem 1: For N → ∞, the value of SINRk is tightly
lower bounded by a deterministic value SINRk
N→∞
< SINRk
which is given by
SINRk =
τ2PIc
2
k∑
j 6=k
ck,j + τ2PI c¯2k + c¯
(1)
k + c˜k + σ
2
n
τd+1
τd
,
(15)
where
ck = p
T
k diag (ΓkCk) , ck,j = p
T
j ΓkRjpj , c˜k = p
T
ΓkR p,
c¯k = p¯
T diag (ΓkCk) , c¯
(1)
k = p¯
T
ΓkR
(1)
k p¯, and
R
(1)
k = R¯k − τ2PIC2kΓk.
Since SINRk is deterministic (independent of the small-fading
randomness, E[SINRk] = SINRk), and based on (13) and (15),
Rk = log2(1 + SINRk) is a tight lower bound on the ergodic
rate of the attacked user IUk, and known at the CPU.
Rk = log2 (1 + SINRk)
N→∞
< Rk (16)
Proof: See Appendix A.
B. Upper Bound on the EH Ergodic Rate
The received signal at the eavesdropping antenna of the EH
in (6c) can be recast as follows
yEk = bkqk +
∑
j 6=k
bjqj + bˆkz + b+ n¯,
bj = g
T
Ewj , bˆk = g
T
Ew¯k, b = g
T
Ew.
(17)
In the following, we assume the worst-case scenario in which
the EH has full knowledge of its own channel vectors, gE and
g; and the beamforming vectors {wi}. With this worst-case
assumption, an upper bound on the ergodic information rate
at the EH is given in the following theorem.
Theorem 2: With a worst-case scenario assumption that the
EH has full knowledge of its own channel and the beamform-
ing vectors of the IUs, the EH is capable of cancelling the
inter-user interference [30, Chapter 8]. Since the information,
{qi}, the AN signal, z, and the energy signal, w, are statisti-
cally independent, we have the following upper bound, REk ,
on the ergodic rate of the EH intending to eavesdrop IUk,
REk , given by
REk = log2 (1 + E [SINREk ]) ≥
REk = E [log2 (1 + SINREk)] ,
(18)
for which
E
[
SINREk =
|bk|2
|bˆk|2 + |b|2 + σ2n
]
N→∞→
E
[
|bk|2
]
E
[
|bˆk|2 + |b|2 + σ2n
] = τ2φPEd2k + d(1)k
τ2φPE d¯2k + d¯
(1)
k + d+ σ
2
n
,
(19)
where
dk = p
T
k diag (ΓCk) , d
(1)
k = p
T
k ΓR
(2)
k pk, d = p
T
ΓR p,
d¯k = p¯
T diag (ΓCk) , d¯
(1)
k = p¯
T
ΓR
(2)
k p¯, and
R
(2)
k = R¯k − τ2φPEC2kΓ.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Such a worst-case scenario is commonly employed by much
of the current research to guarantee maximum information
security [20], [31]. Ensuring the confidentiality of the informa-
tion for the worst-case scenario design ensures confidentiality
for more optimistic scenarios.
C. Lower Bound on the Ergodic Secrecy Rate of IUk
Using the lower bound and the upper bound on the infor-
mation rates at the attacked user IUk and the EH given in (16)
and (18), we assess the secrecy of information at IUk in terms
of ESR which has the following lower bound
RSk
N→∞→ [Rk −REk]+ . (20)
D. Average Harvested Energy at the EH
The EH relies on the dual functionality of its antennas to
harvest energy and eavesdrop information simultaneously. The
whole signal received via the legitimate antenna is devoted for
energy harvesting, while the signal received via the illegitimate
antenna is used for information decoding. However, since
the CPU blames the EH for the active attack, the received
signals via both antennas are accounted for the CPU for energy
harvesting. The AHE by the EH intending to eavesdrop IUk
is7
Ek = ζ E
[
|bk|2 +
∑
j 6=k
|bj |2 +
∣∣∣bˆk∣∣∣2 + |b|2 +∑
j
∣∣∣b˜j∣∣∣2 + ∣∣∣˜ˆbk∣∣∣2
+
∣∣∣b˜∣∣∣2 ] = ζ
[
τ2φPEd
2
k + d
(1)
k +
∑
j 6=k
dk,j + τ
2φPE d¯
2
k + d¯
(1)
k
+ d+
∑
j
dk,j + d˜k + τ
2(1− φ)PE d˜2 + τσ2nd˜(1)
]
,
(21)
where
b˜j = g
Twj ,
˜ˆ
bk = g
T w¯k, b˜ = g
Tw, dk,j = p
T
j ΓRjpj ,
d˜k = p¯
T
ΓR¯k p¯, d˜ = p
T diag (ΓC) , and d˜(1) = pTΓC2p.
IV. POWER CONTROL OF DOWNLINK TRANSMISSION
A. Problem Formulation
In our system, a single AP, APj , transmits a set of M + 2
different types of signals, {{[wi]jqi}i, [w¯k]jz, [w]j}. With
the random geometric distribution of the APs with respect to
the IUs and the EH, the power control in the cell-free MIMO
system has an advantage over the conventional MIMO that
different users have different subsets of dominant serving APs.
In the long-term, the CPU can achieve a fair and secured
SWIPT transmission towards the IUs and the EH by balancing
the average levels of transmit powers at the APs within the
power limits of each AP. The power control aims to maximize
the worst-case ESR, mink RSk , with a constraint on the
7Detailed derivation of the results in (21) are in Appendix A.
7minimum AHE requirement of the legitimate EH. Therefore,
our constrained problem is
maximize
{pi}, p¯, p
min
k
RSk
subject to
Ek ≥ E¯, ∀k, (22a)[
M∑
i=1
E[wiw
H
i ] + E[w¯kw¯
H
k ] + E[ww
H ]
]
j,j
≤ Pt, ∀j, ∀k,
(22b)
where Pt is the available power budget at each AP. The
constraint (22b) guarantees the average power consumption at
each AP is within the limit, Pt. Problem (22) is non-convex
since the objective function is a logarithm of multiplicative
fractional functions. Without loss of generality, we assume
that (22) is always feasible and focus on solving it. We use
the exponential variable substitution method used in [32] and
[33] to transform the logarithmic objective function of (22)
into an equivalent linear function. By using the properties of
logarithmic and exponential functions, the objective function
of (22) can be expressed as loge2 ln(e
uk−skevk−tk) where
euk = τ2PIc
2
k +
∑
j 6=k
ck,j + τ
2PI c¯
2
k + c¯
(1)
k + c˜k + σ
2
n
τd + 1
τd
(23a)
esk =
∑
j 6=k
ck,j + τ
2PI c¯
2
k + c¯
(1)
k + c˜k + σ
2
n
τd + 1
τd
(23b)
etk = τ2φPEd
2
k + d
(1)
k + τ
2φPE d¯
2
k + d¯
(1)
k + d+ σ
2
n (23c)
evk = τ2φPE d¯
2
k + d¯
(1)
k + d+ σ
2
n. (23d)
Since the logarithmic functions are monotonically increas-
ing in their arguments, then (22) can be recast as
maximize
{pi}, p¯, p
{uk, sk, tk, vk}
min
k
(uk − sk + vk − tk)
subject to
τ2PIc
2
k +
∑
j 6=k
ck,j + τ
2PI c¯
2
k + c¯
(1)
k + c˜k + σ
2
n
τd + 1
τd
≥ euk , ∀ k, (24a)∑
j 6=k
ck,j + τ
2PI c¯
2
k + c¯
(1)
k + c˜k + σ
2
n
τd + 1
τd
,
≤ es¯k (sk − s¯k + 1) , ∀ k, (24b)
τ2φPEd
2
k + d
(1)
k + τ
2φPE d¯
2
k + d¯
(1)
k + d+ σ
2
n
≤ et¯k (tk − t¯k + 1) , ∀ k, (24c)
τ2φPE d¯
2
k + d¯
(1)
k + d+ σ
2
n ≥ evk , ∀ k, (24d)
(22a), (22b). (24e)
Our new objective in (24) is monotonically increasing
with mink RSk . The constraints (24a)–(24e) bound the slack
variables uk, sk, tk, vk of the objective function within their
limits defined in (23a)–(23d). The exponential variables esk
and etk are linearized as es¯k(sk− s¯k+1) and et¯k(tk− t¯k+1).
s¯k, t¯k are the initial values around which e
sk and etk are
linearized.
The formulation in (24) is still non-convex since the
right-hand sides of the constraints (24a)–(24e) contain ex-
pressions which are nonlinear in the optimization variables
(the power control factors {{pi}, p¯, p}), such as c2k =(
pTk diag (ΓkCk)
)2
. These nonlinearities arise from the per
AP per user power control (specific for cell-free massive
MIMO systems) where each AP has its own transmit power
constraint. In comparison, these nonlinearities do not exist in
the power control for the conventional (collocated) massive
MIMO systems in which the constraint is on the total transmit
power from all collocated antennas [13]. To deal with these
nonlinearities, we introduce a new method of cooperative
balancing of the transmit powers at the APs via relaxed SDP
formulation which has been proved to be optimal as will be
described in the next subsection.
B. SDP Formulation for Optimal Power Control
In this subsection, we reformulate the non-convex prob-
lem (24) into a relaxed SDP convex problem. To achieve
this, the nonlinear expressions in the power control factors
{{pi}, p¯, p} are represented as linear expressions in terms
of new rank-one positive semidefinite matrix variables {{P i =
pi p
H
i }, P¯ = p¯ p¯H , P = p pH}. For instance, given that k
is the index of the IU under attack, the expression of c2k can
be recast in an SDP form as
c2k =
(
pTk diag (ΓkCk)
)2
= pTk diag (ΓkCk) diag (ΓkCk)
T
pk
= tr
(
pkp
T
k diag (ΓkCk) diag (ΓkCk)
T
)
= tr (P kAk) ,
(25)
where Ak = diag(ΓkCk) diag(ΓkCk)
T . In a comparable
way, the rest of the expressions {ck,j , c¯2k, c¯(1)k , c˜k},
{d2k, d(1)k , d, d¯2k, d¯(1)k } and {dk,j , d˜k, d˜2, d˜(1)} in
(24) can be transformed into linear expressions in terms of
{{P i}, P¯ , P }. With these transformations, we can recast
the non-convex problem in (24) into a convex relaxed8 SDP
formulation as in (26) at the top of the next page, where
S = {{P i}, P¯ , P , {uk, sk, tk, vk}} is the set of
optimization variables and
Ak,j = ΓkRj , A¯k = ΓkR
(1)
k , A˜k = ΓkR
Bk = diag (ΓCk) diag (ΓCk)
H , B¯k = ΓR
(2)
k , B = ΓR,
B˜ = ΓRj , B¨ = diag (ΓC) diag (ΓC)
H
, Bˆ = ΓC2, and
B˜k = ΓR¯k.
The constraints (26e) and (26f) are an SDP recast of (22a)
and (22b), respectively. The constraint (26f) is equivalent to
(22b), whereDl ∈ RN×N has zero entries except [Dl]l,l = 1.
This equivalent representation in (26f) is required to facilitate
the proof of Theorem 3 presented in Appendix A.
The formulation in (26) is convex and can be solved
iteratively based on the initial value update method given in
Algorithm 1. It can be shown that the complex-valued SDP
problem (27) (which is equivalent to (26)) contains: M + 2
semidefinite complex-valued N×N matrix variables, 5M+1
8The formulation in (26) does not impose any constraints on the rank of
{{P i}, P¯ , P }, i.e, {rank(P i)}, rank(P¯ ), rank(P ) ≤ N .
8maximize
S
min
k
(uk − sk + vk − tk)
subject to
τ2PI tr (P kAk) +
∑
j 6=k
tr (P jAk,j) + τ
2PI tr
(
P¯Ak
)
+ tr
(
P¯ A¯k
)
+ tr
(
PA˜k
)
+ σ2n
τd + 1
τd
≥ euk , ∀ k, (26a)
∑
j 6=k
tr (P jAk,j) + τ
2PI tr
(
P¯Ak
)
+ tr
(
P¯ A¯k
)
+ tr
(
PA˜k
)
+ σ2n
τd + 1
τd
≤ es¯k (sk − s¯k + 1) , ∀ k, (26b)
τ2φPE tr (P kBk) + tr
(
P kB¯k
)
+ τ2φPE tr
(
P¯Bk
)
+ tr
(
P¯ B¯k
)
+ tr (PB) + σ2n ≤ et¯k (tk − t¯k + 1) , ∀ k, (26c)
τ2φPE tr
(
P¯Bk
)
+ tr
(
P¯ B¯k
)
+ tr (PB) + σ2n ≥ evk , ∀ k, (26d)
ζ
(
τ2φPE tr (P kBk) + tr
(
P kB¯k
)
+
∑
j 6=k
tr
(
P jB˜j
)
+ τ2φPE tr
(
P¯Bk
)
+ tr
(
P¯ B¯k
)
+ tr (PB) +
∑
j
tr
(
P jB˜j
)
+ tr
(
P¯ B˜k
)
+ τ2(1− φ)PE tr
(
PB¨
)
+ τσ2ntr
(
PBˆ
))
≥ E¯, ∀ k, (26e)
tr
(
P kDlR¯k
)
+
∑
j 6=k
tr (P jDlRj) + tr
(
P¯DlR¯k
)
+ tr (PDlR)− Pt ≤ 0, ∀ l, ∀ k, (26f)
{P k} , P¯ , P  0. (26g)
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for solving problem (26)
1: Initialize {s¯
[n]
k
} and {t¯
[n]
k
}, n = 1.
2: Repeat
3: Solve problem (26) and calculate {s
[n]
k
} and {t
[n]
k
}.
4: Increment n = n+ 1.
5: Update the initial values s¯
[n]
k
= ln(es¯
[n−1]
k (s
[n−1]
k
− s¯
[n−1]
k
+ 1)) and
t¯
[n]
k
= ln(et¯
[n−1]
k (t
[n−1]
k
− t¯
[n−1]
k
+ 1)).
6: Until Convergence.
real scalar variables, 6M + NM + 2 constraints on matrix
variable of size N×N , andM constraints on scalar variables.
The complexity (in terms of number of complex operations)
of obtaining a per iteration solution of (26) within accuracy ǫ
is asymptotically upper bounded by O(M4N 92 log(1
ǫ
)) [34].
This result assumes unstructured input data matrices. However,
the optimization solver (such as SeDuMi employed by CVX
software [35]) can exploit the structure of input data matrices –
for example, the structure of single non-zero element matrices
{Dl} – to reduce the computational complexity [34].
C. Global Optimality of the SDP Formulation
To investigate the optimality of the solution obtained by
(26), let us rewrite (26) in the equivalent form in (27) by
replacing the objective mink (uk − sk + vk − tk) by a new
slack viable π and K linear constraints as
maximize
{P i}, P¯ , P
{diag([uk, sk, tk, vk])}, π
π
subject to diag([uk, sk, tk, vk])− πI4  0, ∀k, (27a)
(26a)–(26g). (27b)
By examining (27) with the first-order and the second-order
conditions of convexity, we have
∂π
∂π
= 1, and
∂2π
∂π2
= 0. (28)
This means that (26) is convex with an affine objective func-
tion. Since the constraints of (26) are differentiable and there
are no constraints on the domain of the optimization variables
{P i}, P¯ , P ∈ S+, {uk, sk, tk, vk}, π ∈ R, then Slater’s
condition holds and the solution obtained by solving (26) is
globally optimal subject to: 1) satisfying the rank requirement
of {P i}, P¯ and P ; 2) and the convergence of the constraints
(26b) and (26c) (which results in the convergence of the
iterative problem (26)).
1) Rank-one Optimality: Generally, the optimality of the
solutions obtained via SDP programming might require a rank
higher than one. The rank requirement for the optimality of
the solutions obtained by SDP problems has been investigated
in [36, Lemma 3.1] which is quoted as:
Lemma 2: Suppose that the separable SDP (P1) and its dual
(D1) are solvable. Then, problem (P1) has always an optimal
solution {X⋆1, . . . , X⋆L} such that
L∑
l=1
rank2 (X⋆l ) ≤M. (29)
where {X1, . . . , XL} are the semi-definite matrix vari-
ables of (P1), {X⋆1, . . . , X⋆L} are their optimal val-
ues and M (for (29) only) is the number of constraints.
Nevertheless, for our problem (26), the obtained solution
{P ⋆i }, P¯ ⋆ and P ⋆ needs to satisfy the rank-one structure
{rank(P ⋆i )}, rank(P¯ ⋆), rank(P ⋆) = 1 which complies with
the optimality condition (29) in Lemma 2. The compliance of
{P ⋆i }, P¯ ⋆ and P ⋆ with rank-one requirement is given in the
following theorem
Theorem 3: Given that S⋆ = {{P ⋆i }, P¯ ⋆, P ⋆, {u⋆k, s⋆k, t⋆k,
9v⋆k}} is the solution obtained by solving (26),
then, the optimized power control factor matrices
{P ⋆i }, P¯ ⋆, P ⋆ always satisfy the rank-one constraint,
i.e., {rank(P ⋆i )}, rank(P¯ ⋆), rank(P ⋆) = 1.
Proof: See Appendix B.
2) Convergence of the Iterative Problem: Here, we prove
that the iterative optimization (26) converges to a globally
optimal value, and the objective value (which is monotonically
increasing with minkRSk ) is increasing with the iterations. To
facilitate our proof, let us introduce the following results:
Lemma 3: For arbitrary real values of x and x¯ 6= x,
the first order approximation ex¯ (x− x¯+ 1) is always an
underestimate of ex, i.e.
ex¯ (x− x¯+ 1) ≤ ex, ∀ x¯ < x, x¯ > x. (30)
Proof: See Appendix C.
Lemma 4: For arbitrary real values of x and x¯ 6= x,
the successive first order approximations of ex; f [n] =
ex¯
[n] (
x− x¯[n] + 1) and f [n+1] = ex¯[n+1] (x− x¯[n+1] + 1),
ex¯
[n+1]
= f [n]; always satisfy f [n+1] > f [n] for x¯[n] 6= x.
Proof: See Appendix C.
Without loss of generality, we assume that (26) is feasible
in its first iteration. Since our problem is convex and Slater’s
condition holds (see (28) and the paragraph that follows),
constraints (26b) and (26c) can strictly hold. With the first
order linearisation in (26b) and (26c), and according to Lemma
3, the constraints (26b) and (26c) are tighter than their original
formulations in (24b) and (24c), i.e., the feasibility region of
(24) is smaller than and a subregion of the feasibility region
of (26). Therefore, any non-converged solution is suboptimal.
According to Lemma 4, and since the constraints (26b)
and (26c) are initialized in the nth iteration by the optimal
values obtained at the (n − 1)th preceding iteration such as
es¯
[n]
k = es¯
[n−1]
k (s⋆
[n−1]
k −s¯[n−1]k +1) and et¯
[n]
k = et¯
[n−1]
k (t⋆
[n−1]
k −
t¯
[n−1]
k + 1), ∀ k, the feasibility of the (n − 1)th iteration
will ensure the feasibility of the succeeding nth iteration.
Furthermore, the feasibility region at the nth iteration is larger
than the feasibility region at the (n − 1)th iteration and
contains it. This ensures that the optimized objective value is
monotonically increasing with the successive iteration. Given
that the constrained values in (26b) and (26c) are finitely
bounded (since both constraints are linear and the power
budget at every AP is finite, ≤ Pt), therefore, it can be
concluded that the increasing optimized objective value will
certainly converge, let us say at the nth iteration, i.e.
es¯
[n]
k
(
s⋆
[n]
k − s¯[n]k + 1
)
= es¯
[n−1]
k
(
s⋆
[n−1]
k − s¯[n−1]k + 1
)
.
(31)
By solving the updating method, es¯
[n]
k = es¯
[n−1]
k (s⋆
[n−1]
k −
s¯
[n−1]
k + 1) and (31), we have s
⋆[n]
k = s¯
[n]
k , and e
s¯
[n]
k (s⋆
[n]
k −
s¯
[n]
k + 1) = e
s⋆
[n]
k . This indicates that the constraint (26b)
converges to its original nonlinearized form. Likewise, the
constraint (26c) converges to its original nonlinearized form.
V. EVALUATIONS
In this section, we evaluate the asymptotic performance of
our SWIPT cell-free massive MIMO system. The APs are
TABLE II
SELECTED VALUES OF SYSTEM PARAMETERS
Parameter Value
Aa, λa 1× 1 Km2, 1.5× 10−4 m−1
Au, M 300× 300 m2, 3
α, σ 2.5, 8 dB [37]
P , PE , Pt 1 W , 1 W , 500 mW
τ , τd , ζ 10, 10, 0.5 [38]
200 100 0 100 200
200
100
0
100
200
AP
IU
EH
Fig. 2. AP-user deployment, N = 145 and M = 3.
randomly located on a two dimensional Euclidean area Aa
based on an homogeneous PPP Φa with an intensity λa. The
IUs and the EH are randomly located on a two dimensional
Euclidean area Au with the origins of Aa and Au coincident
(please refer to footnote 1 regarding this assumption). The
large-scale fading coefficients {γi,j , γj} are modeled with
the standard distance-based model as γi,j , d
−α
i,j 10
νi,j
10 and
γj , d
−α
j 10
ν
10 , where di,j and dj are the distances from IUi
and the EH to APj , respectively. α is the pathloss exponent
and ν, νi,j ∼ CN (0, σ2) are the shadow fading coefficients
with standard division σ. All users experience independent
shadow fading, i.e., νi,j and νi,js are independent random
variables (RVs). P , PE and Pt are the training power budget
at every IU, the training power budget at the EH, and the
transmit power budget at every AP, respectively. τ and ζ are
the length of the training sequences and the energy harvesting
efficiency at the EH, respectively. Unless otherwise stated,
and for referencing convenience, the selected values of system
parameters are listed in Table II.
Fig. 2 shows the AP-user deployment geometry of a real-
ization in which the number of APs is N = 145 (E(N) =
λaAa = 150), M = 3 IUs and one EH zoomed into the
central 500× 500 m2.
The SWIPT secrecy performance is presented by the E-R
plot which relates the achievable worst-case ESR, mink RSk ,
to the constraint on the minimum AHE by the EH, E¯. The
larger the area under the E-R curve, the better the SWIPT
performance. Our design analyses are made based on the
10
Worst-case ESR (b/s/Hz)
0 0.5 1 1.5
A
H
E
co
n
st
ra
in
ts
(m
W
)
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
φ = 0.4
φ = 0.3
Fig. 3. E-R regions of colocated MIMO.
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Fig. 4. E-R regions of cell-free MIMO.
asymptotic assumption N → ∞, then, the system’s perfor-
mance can be examined for a realistic scenario of a large but
finite number of APs.
In colocated MIMO systems, the user exhibits a constant
average path-loss to all of the base station’s (BS’s) colocated
antennas, and that average path-loss varies from one user
to another based on the user’s location. In contrast, in cell-
free MIMO systems, the average path-loss of a given user
varies from one AP to another. Intuitively, this property of
randomly distributed APs is anticipated to increase the effi-
ciency of power control in tackling the active eavesdropping.
For fair comparisons between the performance of cell-free
and colocated MIMO systems, a comparable model of single-
cell colocated massive MIMO system is derived such that: 1)
the total number of colocated antennas at the BS is equal
to the total number of APs, N ; 2) the average value of
a user’s pathloss to the BS in colocated MIMO (all users
experience equal pathlosses) is equal to the average value of
the users’ pathlosses in cell-free MIMO; 3) the total transmit
power is equal for both system, and the power limits at the
colocated MIMO is per antenna; 4) the antennas of the BS are
uncorrelated. Defining γ¯i and γ¯ as the pathlosses of IUi and
the EH in the colocated MIMO system, respectively, we have
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Fig. 5. ESR versus the intensity of homogeneous PPP, λa.
γ¯i =
∑
j
γi,j
N
and γ¯ =
∑
j
γj
N
. The downlink beamfoming and
power control of the colocated MIMO can be performed by
the same methods used for cell-free MIMO.
Fig. 3 shows the E-R regions of the colocated MIMO
system for two different values of active eavesdropping power
corresponding to training power splitting factors φ = 0.3 and
φ = 0.4. It can be noticed that there is a tradoff between the
ESR and the constraint on the AHE. As the AHE constraint
increases, more downlink transmission resources are optimized
to satisfy the increase in AHE constraint at the expense of
the ESR which tends to decrease. Also, there is a clear gap
between the ESR performances at different levels of active
eavesdropping powers. The larger the eavesdropping power
the lower the ESR.
Fig. 4 shows the E-R regions of the cell-free MIMO system
for the same values of active eavesdropping powers used for
colocated MIMO system. By comparing Fig. 3 and Fig. 4,
it can be noticed that the cell-free MIMO outperforms the
colocated MIMO within the interval in which the harvested
energy constraint is low and vice versa. The cell-free MIMO
is also found to be more immune to the increase in the active
eavesdropping power than the colocated MIMO. In colocated
MIMO, all antennas contribute to the AHE by an equal average
value which is not the case for the cell-free MIMO. Therefore,
the colocated MIMO is more efficient at power transfer than
the cell-free MIMO. The difference between channel gains of
the IU and the EH in the cell-free system offers the optimizer
more freedom to balance the tradeoff between the information,
AN and the energy signal powers than in the case of the
colocated MIMO system. That justifies the advantage of cell-
free MIMO over the colocated MIMO in the feasible region
(the low AHE constraint region).
Fig. 5 shows how the density of APs affects the secrecy
performance. The achievable worst-case ESR is measured
versus a set of practically large values of AP densities λa =
10−4 × [0.2, 0.4, ..., 2.6] m−1. The values of the worst-
case ESR in Fig. 5 are obtained by Monte Carlo simulation
averaged over 50 independent realizations of AP deployments,
with E¯ = 0 and φ = 0.3. As expected, as the AP density
(which is directly proportional to E[N ]) increases, the worst-
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Fig. 6. ESR versus the separation between the IU and the
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Fig. 7. Convergence speed of the iterative program in (26)
for E¯ = 2 mW and φ = 0.4.
case ESR increases.
The secrecy performance is affected by the relative location
of the attacked IU with respect to the EH. Fig. 6 shows the
ESR performance for the case where the system comprises
one IU and one EH lying on the x-axis symmetrically around
the origin of the APs’ deployment given in Fig 2. The results
represent the achieved ESR for different separation distances
between the IU and the EH, ∆ = [0, 100, . . . , 500]. As
the separation ∆ increases, the ESR performance improves.
This can be justified since as the separation increases, the
APs subsets that dominantly serve the IU and the EH become
more distinctive. Beyond a certain value of ∆ > 200, the
achieved ESR starts to saturate since the dominant subsets of
the APs that serve the IU and the EH remain unchanged, but
the position of each user within its set varies. The value∆ = 0
means that the IU and the EH are colocated, i.e., Γ1 = Γ.
Fig. 7 shows the convergence speed of Algorithm 1 at
φ = 0.4, E¯ = 2 mW and the initial values are selected
arbitrarily as s¯
[1]
i = t¯
[1]
i = [−8, − 6] ∀ i. As discussed in
Subsection IV-C2, the optimized objective value is increasing
with iterations until convergence.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, relaxed SDP programming has been proposed
to optimize a nonlinear power control of the downlink trans-
mission in a SWIPT cell-free massive MIMO system in the
presence of an information-untrusted dual-antenna active EH.
The downlink SWIPT transmissions include: information, AN
and energy signals beamformed towards the IUs, legitimate
and illegitimate antennas of the EH, respectively. Analytic
expressions for the AHE and a tight lower bound on the ESR
were derived with taking into account the IUs’ knowledge
attained by downlink effective precoded-channel training. It
has been proved that the proposed SDP iterative problem
can always achieve a converged rank-one globally optimal
solution. A fair comparison between the proposed cell-free
and the colocated massive MIMO systems showed that the
cell-free MIMO outperformed the colocated MIMO over the
interval in which the AHE constraint is low and vice versa.
Also, cell-free MIMO was more immune to the increase in
the active eavesdropping power than the colocated MIMO.
APPENDIX A
PROOFS OF LEMMA 1, THEOREMS 1 AND 2
A. Proof of Lemma 1
Since the spectral radius of the diagonal matrices Γi, Γ and√
ΓiΓ are bounded [13, Lemma 2], then by expanding y
H
i yi
followed by applying Corollary 1 in [39] we get
yHi yi − τ2PI tr (Γi)−Nτσ2n N→∞→ δij τ2φPE tr (Γ) , (32)
which satisfies the asymptotic convergence in (3). This con-
cludes the proof.
B. Proof of Theorem 1
Before commencing our proof, let us introduce the follow-
ing result.
Lemma 5: For a non-negative bounded RV X1 ≤ U , U is a
positive real value, and a symmetrical zero mean RV X2, the
non-negative RV Y = X1+X2 is upper bounded as Y ≤ 2U
Proof: We have P ((X1 + X2) < 0) = 0, then P (U +
X2 < 0) = 0, i.e., P (X2 < −U) = 0. By symmetry
of distribution, P (X2 > U) = 0 which implies X2 ≤ U .
Therefore, Y ≤ 2U . This concludes the proof.
Let IUk be the attacked IU. Based on (2), (5a), (7) and (9)
we have
|aˆk,k|2 = τ2PI
∣∣∣h¯Hk Γ 12k diag (pk)CkΓ 12k h¯k∣∣∣2
+
∣∣∣h¯Hk Γ 12k diag (pk)Ckh˜k∣∣∣2 +
∣∣∣∣nkψ
∗
dk
τd
∣∣∣∣
2 (33)
where h˜k = hˆk−τ
√
PICkhk = τ
√
φPE gE+Nψ
∗
k, and the
entries of h˜k, hk and nk are statistically independent. Using
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TABLE III. RELATIVE VALUES OF ∆1 AND ∆2
Realization 1st 2nd 3rd 4th
∆1 9.8×10−3 7.3×10−3 1.6×10−2 4.6×10−3
∆2 6.9×10−5 1.1×10−4 3.8×10−5 1.2×10−4
∆1
∆2
1.4× 102 0.65×102 4.1× 102 0.3× 102
Corollary 1 in [39] and Lemma 2 in [13], the first term in (33)
asymptotically converges to the deterministic value
∆1 = τ
2PI tr
2(Γkdiag(pk)Ck)
= τ2PI
(
pTk diag(ΓkCk)
)2
= τ2PI tr (P kAk) = τ
2PIc
2
k =
τ2PI
(∑
j
γ2k,j c¯
2
k,jpk,j +
∑
I
γk,jγk,mc¯k,j c¯k,m
√
pk,jpk,m
)
,
(34)
where I = {{k, j}j × {k,m}m|{k, j} 6= {k,m}} and c¯k,j =
[Ck]j,j . With the assumption that the noise variance σ
2
n ≪
τφPE , we can approximate the sum of the second and the
third terms in (33) as ∆2 = τ
2φPE |h¯Hk Γ
1
2
k diag (pk)CkgE |2,
which is equivalent to
∆2 =τ
2φPE
( N∑
j=1
γk,jγj c¯
2
k,jpk,j κj+
∑
I
√
γk,jγjγk,mγmc¯k,j c¯k,m
√
pk,jpk,m κj,m
)
,
(35)
where κj = |hˆk,j gˆEj |2 (equivalent to the product of two
independent exponential RVs of parameter 1) is a non-negative
RV with the mean value E[κj ] = 1. κj,m = hˆk,j gˆEj hˆk,mgˆEm ,
j 6= m, is a zero mean RV with a symmetric distribution [40],
[41]. Since ∆2 is always positive, i.e., P (∆2 < 0) = 0, then,
by applying Theorem A in [42] (which defines an upper bound
on the sum of non-negative RVs) and Lemma 5, ∆2 is upper
bounded by a deterministic value as
∆2 ≤ ∆2 = 4eτ2φPE
N∑
j=1
γk,jγj c¯
2
k,jpk,j . (36)
Given that the additive terms that constitute ∆1 in (34) and
the upper bound of ∆2, ∆2, in (36) are of a finite order of
magnitude, then, asymptotically, we have ∆1
N→∞→ O (N2)
and ∆2
N→∞→ O (N). Therefore, as N → ∞, ∆1 and ∆2
differ by O (N) order of magnitude which implies that the
bound |aˆk,k|2 ≥ ∆1 = τ2PI tr (P kAk) is tight. Based on this
result, (14), (15), and since SINRk and SINRk share the same
denominator, then SINRk > SINRk in (15) is of the same
degree of tightness. To validate the tightness of SINRk
N→∞
>
SINRk numerically, Table III presents the values of ∆1, ∆2
and ∆1
∆2
for different realizations of {Γi} and Γ at a large
average value of N = 100, and at E¯ = 5 mW . The optimized
values of {P i}, P¯ and P used to obtain the values of ∆1 are
used to calculate corresponding value of ∆2. The obtained
results validate our analysis.
The values of var(Zk,k) =
∑
j 6=k ck,j + τ
2PI c¯
2
k + c¯
(1)
k + c˜k
and var(a˜k,k) = σ
2
n
τd+1
τd
(as in (14)-(15)) can be calculated as
follows. We have
a˜k,k = ak,k − E [ak,k|aˆk,k] = ak,k − aˆk,k = ak,k − yIk
τd
= ak,k −
yIkψ
∗
dk
τd
= ak,k −
(∑M
j=1 ak,jψ
T
dj
+ nk
)
ψ∗dk
τd
= ak,k −
ak,kτd + nkψ
∗
dk
τd
=
nkψ
∗
dk
τd
.
(37)
The second equality follows from (12a). The third and fifth
equalities follow from substituting (9) and (7), respectively.
Since E(nk) = 0, then E(a˜k,k) = 0 and therefore
var (a˜k,k) = E
[|a˜k,k|2] = E
[
nkψ
∗
dk
ψTdkn
H
k
τ2d
]
=
τdσ
2
n
τ2d
=
σ2n
τd
.
(38)
var (a˜k,k) + σn =
σn
τ2
d
+ σ2n = σ
2
n
τd+1
τd
is equivalent to the last
term in the denominator of (15). Regarding Zk,k, the additive
terms that constitute Zk,k in (11) are zero mean statistically
independent RVs since the entries of {ak,j}j 6=k, w¯k, w and
ni are zero mean statistically independent RVs. Therefore,
var(Zk,k) =∑
j 6=k
E
[|ak,j |2]+ E [|hTk w¯k|2]+ E [|hTkw|2]+ E [|ni|2] .
(39)
The expectations in (39) are calculated as follows.
E
[|ak,j |2] = E [|hTkwj |2] = E [|hTkwjwHj h∗k|2]
= E
[
|h¯TkΓ
1
2
k diag
(
pj
)
hˆ
∗
j hˆ
T
j diag
(
pj
)
Γ
1
2
k h¯
∗
k|2
]
= E
[
|h¯TkΓ
1
2
k diag
(
pj
)
E
[
hˆ
∗
j hˆ
T
j
]
diag
(
pj
)
Γ
1
2
k h¯
∗
k|2
]
= tr
(
Γ
1
2
k diag
(
pj
)
Rjdiag
(
pj
)
Γ
1
2
k
)
= pTj ΓkRjpj
= tr (P jΓkRj) = tr (P jAk,j) = ck,j .
(40)
The third equality in (40) is obtained by substituting the values
of hk and wj from (5a). In the fourth equality, the expectation
is moved to hˆ
∗
j hˆ
T
j based on the statistical independence
between h¯k and hˆj . The fifth equality follows since the entries
of h¯k are zero mean unit variance independent RVs. The
sixth and the seventh equalities follow since the matrices Γk,
diag
(
pj
)
and Rj are diagonal. The forms p
T
j ΓkRjpj and
tr(P jΓkRj) are identical to those used in (15) and (26a)-
(26b), respectively. For E[|hTk w¯k|2], we substitute the value
of w¯k from (5b), (2a) and (2b) as
E
[
|hTk w¯k|2
]
= E
[
|hTk diag (p¯)Ck
(
τ
√
PIh
∗
k + h˜
∗
k
)
|2
]
= τ2PIE
[
|hTk diag (p¯)Ckh∗k|2
]
+ E
[
|hTk diag (p¯)Ckh˜
∗
k|2
]
= τ2PI |tr (diag (p¯)CkΓk) |2
+ E
[
h¯
T
k Γ
1
2
k diag (p¯)CkE
[
h˜
∗
kh˜
T
k
]
Ckdiag (p¯)Γ
1
2
k h¯
∗
k
]
= τ2PI |p¯T diag (CkΓk) |2 + p¯TΓkR(1)k p¯
= τ2PI c¯
2
k + c¯
(1)
k = τ
2PI tr
(
P¯Ak
)
+ tr
(
P¯ A¯k
)
.
(41)
where h˜k = δik τ
√
φPE gE +Nψ
∗
i . The second equality
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follows from the statistical independent between hk and h˜k.
The first term after the third equality follows from applying
Corollary 1 in [39]. In the second term in the third equality,
the expectation is moved to h˜
∗
kh˜
T
k based on the statistical
independence between h¯k and h˜k. The first term in the fourth
equality follows since the matrices Γk, Ck and diag (p¯) are
diagonal. The second term in the fourth equality follows since
the entries of h¯k are zero mean unit variance independent RVs
and the matrices Γk and R
(1)
k are diagonal. The form which is
after the fourth equality is identical to that used in (15), while
the SDP form which is after the sixth equality is identical
to that used in (26a)-(26b). For E[|hTkw|2], we substitute the
value of w from (5c) as
E
[
|hTkw|2
]
= E
[
|hTk diag (p) gˆ∗|2
]
= E
[
h¯
T
kΓ
1
2
k diag (p)E
[
gˆ∗gˆT
]
diag (p)Γ
1
2
k h¯
∗
k
]
= pTΓkR p = c˜k = tr
(
PA˜k
)
.
(42)
In the second equality, the expectation is moved to gˆ
∗
gˆ
T
based
on the statistical independence between h¯k and gˆ. The third
equality follows since the entries of h¯k are zero mean unit
variance independent RVs and the matrices Γk and R are
diagonal. The form which is after the third equality is identical
to that used in (15), while the SDP form which is after the
fifth equality is identical to that used in (26a)-(26b).
C. Proof of Theorem 2
Based on the assumption that the EH has a full knowledge
of the IUs’ beamforming vectors and its own channel, the
EH is capable of cancelling the inter-user interference [30].
Furthermore, the information, AN and energy signals; {qi},
z and w; are statistically independent. Therefore, based on
the concavity of the logarithmic function, applying Jensen’s
inequality (which has been proven to be tight and suitable
for characterizing the performance of massive MIMO systems
[43]) will result in the following upper bound on the ergodic
rate at the EH
REk = log2 (1 + E [SINREk ]) > E [log2 (1 + SINREk)] ,
(43)
where SINREk is the SINR at the EH when attacking IUk.
As defined in (19), SINREk =
Xk
Yk
, Xk = E[|gTEwkqk|2] = |bk|2
and Yk = E[|gTE(w¯kz +w) + n¯|2] = |bˆk|2 + |b|2 + σ2n . Using
the multivariate Taylor expansion, E[SINREk ] can be expanded
as [44]
E [SINREk ] = E
[
Xk
Yk
]
=
E[Xk]
E[Yk]
− cov(Xk, Yk)
(E[Yk])2
+
var(Yk)
(E[Yk])2
E[Xk]
E[Yk]
+R.
(44)
where R = f(var(Yk), cov(Xk, Yk)) is the reminder of the
series expansion. We have
E[Xk] = E[|bk|2] = E[|gTEwk|2]
= E
[∣∣∣gTEdiag (pk)(τ√φPECkg∗E + h˜(2)k )∣∣∣2
]
= τ2φPE
E
[∣∣∣g¯TEΓ 12 diag (pk)CkΓ 12 g¯∗E∣∣∣2
]
+ E
[∣∣∣gTEdiag (pk) h˜(2)k ∣∣∣2
]
,
(45)
where
E
[∣∣∣g¯TEΓ 12 diag (pk)CkΓ 12 g¯∗E∣∣∣2
]
=
∣∣pTk diag (ΓCk)∣∣2
= tr
(
P kdiag (ΓCk) diag (ΓCk)
H
)
= tr (P kBk) ,
(46)
E
[∣∣∣gTEdiag (pk) h˜(2)k ∣∣∣2
]
= E
[
g¯TEΓ
1
2 diag (pk)E
[
h˜
(2)
k h˜
(2)H
k
]
diag (pk)Γ
1
2 g¯∗E
]
= tr
(
Γ
1
2 diag (pk)R
(2)
k diag (pk)Γ
1
2
)
= tr
(
pTkΓR
(2)
k pk
)
= tr
(
P kΓR
(2)
k
)
= tr
(
P kB¯k
)
(47)
where h˜
(2)
k = hˆ
∗
k − τ
√
φPECkg
∗
E and R
(2)
k =
E[h˜
(2)
k h˜
(2)H
k ] = R¯k − τ2φPEC2kΓ. The third equality in (45)
is obtained by substituting the value of wk from (5a), (2a) and
(2b). The fourth equality in (45) follows from the statistical
independence between gE and h˜
(2)
k . The first equality in (46)
follows from applying Corollary 1 in [39] and the diagonality
of the matrices Γ, Ck and diag (pk). In the first equality in
(47), the expectation is moved to h˜
(2)
k h˜
(2)H
k based on the statis-
tical independence between g¯E and h˜
(2)
k . The second equality
in (47) follows from applying Corollary 1 in [39]. The third
and the fourth equalities in in (47) follow from the diagonality
of the matrices Γ, R
(2)
k and diag (pk). By substituting (46)
and (47) in (45), we get E[Xk] = E[|bk|2] = τ2φPEd2k+d(1)k ,
d2k = tr(P kBk) and d
(1)
k = tr(P kB¯k).
For E[Yk], based on the statistical independence between
w¯k and w, we have
E [Yk] = E
[|gTE(w¯kz +w)|2 + n¯]
= E
[|gTEw¯k|2]+ E [|gTEw|2]+ σ2n. (48)
E
[|gTEw¯k|2]
= τ2φPEE
[|gTEdiag (p¯)Ckg∗E |2]+ E [|gTEdiag (p¯) h˜(2)∗k |2]
= τ2φPE |tr (diag (p¯)ΓCk) |2
+ E
[
g¯TEΓ
1
2 diag (p¯)E
[
h˜
(2)∗
k h˜
(2)T
k
]
diag (p¯)Γ
1
2 g¯∗E
]
= τ2φPE |p¯T diag (ΓCk) |2 + p¯TΓR(2)k p¯
= τ2φPE tr
(
P¯ diag (ΓCk) diag (ΓCk)
H
)
+ tr
(
P¯ΓR
(2)
k
)
= τ2φPE tr(P¯Bk) + tr(P¯ B¯k) = τ
2φPE d¯
2
k + d¯
(1)
k .
(49)
The first equality in (49) follows from substituting the value of
w¯k from (5b), (2a) and (2b); and the statistical independence
between gE and h˜
(2)
k . The first term in the second equality
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follows from applying Corollary 1 in [39]. In the second
term after the second equality, the expectation is moved to
h˜
(2)
k h˜
(2)H
k based on the statistical independence between g¯E
and h˜
(2)
k . The first term in the third equality follows from the
diagonality of the matrices Γ, Ck and diag (p¯k), while the
second term follows since the entries of g¯E are zero mean
unit variance independent RVs and the matrices Γ and R
(2)
k
are diagonal. The fourth equality follows since the matrices
Γ, Ck and R
(2)
k are diagonal.
E
[|gTEw|2] = E [g¯TEΓ 12 diag (p)E [gˆ∗gˆT ] diag (p)Γ 12 g¯∗E]
= pTΓR p = tr(PB) = d.
(50)
The first equality in (50), the expectation is moved to gˆ∗gˆT
based on the statistical independence between g¯E and gˆ. The
second equality follows since the entries of g¯E are zero mean
unit variance independent RVs. The third equality follows
since the matrices Γ and R are diagonal. By substituting the
results from (49) and (50) in (48) we get
E [Yk] = E
[
|bˆk|2 + |b|2 + σ2n
]
= τ2φPE d¯
2
k + d¯
(1)
k + d+ σ
2
n,
(51)
where d = tr(PB), d¯2k = tr(P¯Bk) and d¯
(1)
k = tr(P¯ B¯k). For
var(Yk) we have
var(Yk) = E
[|Yk − E[Yk]|2] = E
[∣∣∣∣∣∣∣gTEw∣∣∣2 − tr (PB)
∣∣∣∣
2
]
+ E
[∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣gTEw¯k∣∣∣2 − τ 2φPE tr (P¯Bk)− tr (P¯ B¯k)
∣∣∣∣
2
]
+ σ2n,
(52)
Now let us calculate the first and the second terms in (52),
as follows
E
[∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣gTEw∣∣∣2 − tr (PB)
∣∣∣∣
2
]
= E
[∣∣∣gTEw∣∣∣4 − 2 ∣∣∣gTEw∣∣∣2 tr (PB) + tr2 (PB)
]
= E
[∣∣∣gTEw∣∣∣4
]
− tr2 (PB)
= E
[(∑
I
g¯Ej
√
γjpj gˆ
∗
j gˆm
√
γmpmg¯
∗
Em
)2]
+ E
[(∑
j
∣∣g¯Ej ∣∣2 γjpj |gˆj |2
)2]
− tr2 (PB)
= 2 tr2 (PB)− tr ((PB)◦2) .
(53)
E
[∣∣∣∣∣∣∣gTEw¯k∣∣∣2 − τ 2φPEtr (P¯Bk)− tr (P¯ B¯k)
∣∣∣∣
2
]
= E
[∣∣∣∣∣∣∣gTEdiag (p¯) h˜(2)k ∣∣∣2 − tr (P¯ B¯k)
∣∣∣∣
2
]
= E
[∣∣∣gTEdiag (p¯) h˜(2)k ∣∣∣4
]
− tr2 (P¯ B¯k)
= E
[(∑
I
g¯Ej
√
γj p¯j
[
hˆ
(2)
k hˆ
(2)H
k
]
j,m
√
γmp¯mg¯
∗
Em
)2]
+ E
[(∑
j
∣∣g¯Ej ∣∣2 γjpj [hˆ(2)k hˆ(2)Hk ]
j,j
)2]
− tr2 (P¯ B¯k)
= 2 tr2
(
P¯ B¯k
)− tr((P¯ B¯k)◦2) ,
(54)
where ◦ denotes the Hadamard power operation and I =
{{j} × {m}| j 6= m}. The second equality in (52) follows
from the statistical independence between w, w¯k and n¯.
The second equality in (53) is obtaioned by substituting
the value of E[|gTEw|2] from (50). The second equality
in (54) is obtained since the norm
∣∣gTEw¯k∣∣2 converges to
τ2φPE tr(P¯Bk)+ |gTEdiag(p¯)h˜
(2)
k |2 in the signal domain. By
expanding the norms |gTEw|4 and |gTEdiag(p¯)h˜
(2)
k |4 – which
are composed of squared exponential RVs – followed by
applying the statistical expectation9, we obtain the final results
in (53) and (54), respectively.
Given that the entries of the matrix Bk have non-zero
positive values, the matrices B¯k and B are diagonal, and
the additive terms in (tr(P¯Bk) + tr(P¯ B¯k) + tr(PB))
2
are of a finite order of magnitude; then, asymptotically,
we have (E[Yk])
2 N→∞→ O (N4) and var(Yk) N→∞→
O (2N2). This implies that var(Yk)(E[Yk])2 N→∞→ 0 and R =
f(var(Yk), cov(Xk, Yk))
N→∞→ 0. Based on (44) and this
result, and since cov(Xk, Yk) = 0 (follows from the statistical
independence between Xk and Yk), we have
E [SINREk ] =
E
[
Xk
Yk
]
N→∞→ E[Xk]
E[Yk]
=
τ2φPEd
2
k + d
(1)
k
d+ τ2φPE d¯2k + d¯
(1)
k + σ
2
n
.
(55)
By substituting (55) in (43), we get (18)–(19). This concludes
the proof.
D. Deriving the asymptotic value of AHE in (21)
The details of deriving E[|bk|2] and E[|bˆk|2 + |b|2] are
provide (45)-(47) and (48)-(51), respectively. The details of
deriving the values E[|bj 6=k|2], E[|b˜j |2], E[|˜ˆbj |2] and E[|b˜|2]
that constitute E¯k in (21) are as follows
E
[|bj 6=k|2] = E [|gTEwj 6=k|2] = E [g¯TEΓ 12 diag (pj)E [hˆ∗j hˆTj ]
diag
(
pj
)
Γ
1
2 g¯∗E
]
= pTj ΓRj pj = tr(P jB˜).
(56)
9The expectation is obtained by applying the fact: For an exponential RV
X ∼ E(λ), the nth moment of X is E[Xn] = Γ(n+1)
λn
=
Γ(n+1)
λn
= n!
λn
.
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E
[
|b˜j |2
]
= E
[|gTwj |2] = E [g¯TΓ 12 diag (pj)E [hˆ∗j hˆTj ]
diag
(
pj
)
Γ
1
2 g¯∗
]
= pTj ΓRj pj = tr(P jB˜),
(57)
E
[
|˜ˆbk|2
]
= E
[|gT w¯k|2] = E [g¯TΓ 12 diag (p¯)E [hˆ∗khˆTk ]
diag (p¯)Γ
1
2 g¯∗
]
= p¯TΓR¯k p¯ = tr(P jB˜k).
(58)
In the second equalities in (56), (57) and (58), the
expectation is moved to hˆ
∗
j 6=khˆ
T
j 6=k, hˆ
∗
j hˆ
T
j and hˆ
∗
khˆ
T
k based
on the statistical independence between g¯E and hˆj 6=k, g¯
and hˆj , and between g¯E and hˆk, respectively. The third
equalities in (56), (57) and (58) follows since the entries of
g¯E and g¯ are zero mean unit variance independent RVs. The
fourth equalities follows since the matrices Γ, Rj and R¯k
are diagonal.
E
[
|b˜|2
]
= E
[|gTw|2] = E [|gT diag (p)C (τ√(1 − φ)PEg∗
+N∗ψE) |2
]
= τ2(1− φ)PEE
[|gT diag (p)Cg∗|2]+
E
[|gT diag (p)CN∗ψE |2]
= τ2(1 − φ)PE |tr (diag (p)CΓ) |2
+ E
[
g¯TΓ
1
2 diag (p)CE
[
N∗ψEψ
H
EN
T
]
Cdiag (p)Γ
1
2 g¯∗
]
= τ2(1 − φ)PE |pT diag (CΓ) |2 + τσ2npTΓC2p
= τ2(1 − φ)PE d˜2 + τσ2nd˜(1)
= τ2(1 − φ)PE tr
(
PB¨
)
+ τσ2ntr
(
PBˆ
)
.
(59)
The second equality follows from the statistical independent
between g and N . The first term after the fourth equality
follows from applying Corollary 1 in [39]. In the second
term in the fourth equality, the expectation is moved to
N∗ψEψ
H
EN
T based on the statistical independence between
g¯ and N . The first term in the fifth equality follows since the
matrices Γ, C and diag (p) are diagonal. The second term in
the fifth equality follows since E[N∗ψEψ
H
EN
T ] = τσ2nIN
and the entries of g¯ are zero mean unit variance independent
RVs. The seventh equality follows since the matrices Γ and
C are diagonal. The form which is after the fifth equality is
identical to that used in (21), while the SDP form which is
after the seventh equality is identical to that used in (26e).
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
To prove that the optimal solution {P ⋆i }, P¯ ⋆, P ⋆ obtained
by solving (26) is always of unity rank, we exploit the
boundedness property of the dual Lagrangian function to
show that the optimal primal matrices {P ⋆i }, P¯ ⋆, P ⋆ can
satisfy the KKT conditions of optimality at one case in which
{rank(P ⋆i )}, rank(P¯ ⋆), rank(P ⋆) = 1, and that has been
validated by computer simulation.
The Lagrangian of the equivalent problem (27) is
L (S,L) =
∑
k
tr (P kΠk) + Tr
(
P¯ Π¯
)
+ Tr (PΠ) + d¯, (60)
where
Πk =λ2kτ
2PIAk +
∑
j 6=k
λ2jAj,k −
∑
j 6=k
λ3jAj,k + (λ6kζ
− λ4k)
(
τ2φPEBk + B¯k
)
+ λ6j ζ
(∑
j 6=k
B˜k +
∑
j
B˜k
)
−
∑
l
(
λ7kDlR¯k +
∑
j 6=k
λ7jDlRk
)
+ F k, (61)
Π¯ =
∑
k
[
(λ2k − λ3k)
(
τ2PIAk + A¯k
)
+ (λ5k − λ4k)
(
τ2PIAk + A¯k
)
+ λ6kζ
(
τ2φPEBk + B¯k + B˜k
)
+
∑
l
λ7kDlR¯k
]
+ F¯ , (62)
Π =
∑
k
[
(λ2k − λ3k)A˜k + (λ5k − λ4k)B + λ6kζ
(
B + Bˆ
+τ2(1− φ)PEB¨
)]
+ F , (63)
d¯ =π +
∑
k=1
[
λ1k (uk − sk − tk + vk − π)− λ2keuk + λ3kesk
+ λ4ke
tk − λ5kevk + (λ2k − λ3k)σ2n
τd + 1
τd
+ (λ5k − λ4k)σ2n − λ6k E¯ + λ7kPT
]
. (64)
L = {{λ1k}, . . . , {λ7k}, {F k}, F¯ , F } are the La-
grange multipliers of the constraints (27a), (26a)–(26f) and the
constraints on {P k}, P¯ and P in (26g), respectively, with
{λjk} ≥ 0, {F k}, F¯ , F  0. Now, for the Lagrangian
function to exist, the infimum of L over the primal variable
S, infS L, should be bounded from below, therefore, we have
Πk, Π¯, Π  0, {λ3k , λ4k} = 0, {λ1k} ≥ 1, ∀k. (65)
Given that Slater’s condition holds (see (28) and the
paragraph that follows) and based on the non-negativeness
of the dual variables (Lagrange multipliers), the satisfaction
of the KKT’s complementary slackness condition results in
tr(P ⋆kF
⋆
k) = 0 ∀ k. The KKT’s stationarity condition should
satisfy
∑
k
∂L
∂P ⋆
k
= 0, therefore∑
k
Π
⋆
k = 0. (66)
Given the fact that if the summation of multiple positive semi-
definite matrices is equal to zero, all the matrices are equal to
zero. And based on the (61), (65) and (66), we have
F ⋆k =− λ2kτ2PIAk +G⋆k, (67)
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G⋆k = −
∑
j 6=k
λ⋆2jAj,k − λ⋆6kζ
(
τ2φPEBk + B¯k
)− λ⋆6j ζ(∑
j 6=k
B˜k +
∑
j
B˜k
)
+
∑
l
(
λ⋆7kDlR¯k +
∑
j 6=k
λ⋆7jDlRk
)
.
(68)
Let null (F ⋆k) = Ωk =
[
ωk,1, ...,ωk,N−rank(F ⋆
k
)
]
and
null (G⋆k) = Ψk =
[
ψk,1, ...,ψk,N−rank(G⋆
k
)
]
. By making
use of the inequality of matrix sum [45, subsection 3.3.4]
and (67) we have10 rank(F ⋆k) ≥ rank(G⋆k) − 1. Based
on this result, and since rank(Ωk) = N − rank(F ⋆k) and
rank(Ψk) = N − rank(G⋆k), then the following result is true
rank (Ωk) ≤ rank (Ψi) + 1. (69)
Now, let us examine the null space of G⋆k, ψk,j ∈ Ψk, by
computing the inner product between ψk,j and F
⋆
k in (67) as
follows
ψHk,jF
⋆
kψk,j = −ψHk,j
(
λ⋆2kτ
2PIAk
)
ψk,j ≤ 0, (70)
where the inequality in (70) follows from11 Ak  0. How-
ever, since F ⋆k  0, (70) can only hold with equality, i.e.,
ψHk,j
(
λ⋆2kτ
2PIAk
)
ψk,j = 0. This result implies that the null
space of G⋆k always forms null space of F
⋆
k, i.e., Ψk is a sub-
matrix of Ωk, therefore, and according to (69), ωk,j ∈ Ωk
belongs to one of the following two spaces: 1) the column
space of Ψk, ωk,j ∈ {ψk,j}; 2) 1-dimensional vector space,
ωk,j = a ∈ CN×1 where a /∈ {ψk,j}.
Since the optimal value of P ⋆k needs to satisfy the comple-
mentary slackness condition, tr(P ⋆kF
⋆
k) = 0 ∀ k, the structure
of P ⋆k is
P ⋆k =
L≤N∑
i=1
mk,jqjq
H
j , qj ∈ {ψk,j , a}, (71)
where {mk,j} are non-negative scaling factors. The P ⋆k’s
component mk,jψk,jψ
H
k,j introduces zero information signal
power at IUk since ψ
H
k,jAkψk,j = 0, and therefore contributes
by a negative ESR. Thus,mk,jψk,jψ
H
k,j is a non-optimal com-
ponent of P ⋆k. By this, we can conclude that P
⋆
k is constructed
by the single component P ⋆k = mk,1aa
H , a /∈ {ψk,j},
therefore, rank(P ⋆k) = 1 is always true. This concludes the
proof.
APPENDIX C
PROOFS OF LEMMAS 3 AND 4
A. Proof of Lemma 3
Since the exponential function is convex (has a downward
curvature), the tangent line at any point is below the function
trajectory. Using triangulation (as depicted in Fig. 8), it can
be easily understood that the value of the Taylor first order
approximation of ex, ex¯(x− x¯+1), always lies at the tangent
line (L1, black solid line) which is always below the function
10Please note that rank(Ak) = 1, this is understandable from the structure
of Ak . Please refer to the first paragraph in IV-B.
11Ak  0 follows since it is structured from a vector whose all entries are
positive (see (25) and the paragraph that follows).
e
x
e
x¯
e
x¯
x¯x¯ x
L2
L1
e
x¯(x− x¯)
e
x¯(x− x¯)
Fig. 8. The geometry of the successive first order
approximation.
trajectory (circle-marked line). Fig. 8 shows the case x¯ < x.
Following a comparable reasoning, the previous result can be
proved for the other case x¯ > x. This concludes the proof.
B. Proof of Lemma 4
Building upon the proof of Lemma 3, the value of succes-
sive Taylor approximation ex¯(x− x¯+1), ex¯ = ex¯(x− x¯+1),
lies at the tangent line (L2, star-marked line in Fig. 8) touched
at (x¯, ex¯). Since the derivative of the exponential function is
non-decreasing,L2 always lies above L1 for x ≥ x¯. Therefore,
ex¯(x− x¯+1) > ex¯(x− x¯+1) is always true. This concludes
the proof.
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